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“We no longer want to do any kind of business with Spain. I would like that to stop. Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They do not take part, they do not pay. I do not want anything to do with Spain. Cut off all trade with Spain, please, including visits,” Donald Trump once again declared at a joint press conference after the NATO meeting in Ankara, with an impassive Mark Rutte looking on.
As a former Dutch prime minister, the secretary general of the Atlantic Alliance could have reminded the US president that responsibility for the EU member states’ trade policy lies with the Commission, albeit with certain nuances.
Since the creation of the single market in 1993, decisions on tariffs, trade agreements and other measures have been an exclusive EU competence. Coercive action against one of the 27 would have direct effects on the rest and would, in all likelihood, trigger a joint response.
Trade flows between two of these countries are not even classed as exports, but as “intra-Community supplies”. This interconnection also means, for instance, that oranges grown in Valencia may be processed in another European country before being shipped to the US, making any unilateral action extremely complicated.
“The US federal government knows how the EU manages its trade relations and is not interested in breaking them off,” replied Teresa Ribera, the EU’s competition chief and a former minister under Pedro Sánchez, last March when she was asked about this issue after Trump once again threatened Spain.
The alternative, namely Brussels failing to respond to an economic attack on one of its members, would undermine the very design of the single market, as it would amount to ignoring the bloc’s treaties by treating a member state as if it did not belong to the EU.
The figures: a trade deficit that currently harms the Spanish side
Even leaving that aside, Trump would stand to lose more if he carried out his threats. In 2025 data, only 4.9% of Spain’s goods exports go to the United States, worth around 18 billion euros, a share that makes it less dependent than countries such as Italy (10.7%) or Germany (9.9%).
By contrast, US exports to Spain amount to around 23 billion euros, which technically means the North American giant runs a trade surplus in this bilateral flow. That said, its exports to Spain account for only about 1.2% of the US total.
Some sectors are more exposed than others, as we explained in this earlier analysis. Capital and semi-manufactured goods, such as industrial machinery and chemical products, make up more than half of Spanish exports to the US, while food products account for around 18%.
Within these sectors, exports of engines and construction materials are among the Spanish goods most in demand in the US. As for foodstuffs, oils and fats, including olive oil, represent around 14% of Spanish exports that cross the Atlantic.
When it comes to tariffs, Section 122 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act places limits on presidential powers: a cap of 15% and a maximum duration of 150 days for the tariff measure, after which a renewal would require Congress. Sections 232 and 301 require prior formal investigations, lengthening the process.
Other potentially applicable unilateral measures
Beyond trade policy as such, Trump could impose individual sanctions on legal entities or individuals through his Bureau of Industry and Security or the Treasury Department, as happened in the case of rapporteur Francesca Albanese, without going through congressional oversight. This can be done by restricting banking services, travel or diplomatic contacts for both public and private entities.
The Commerce Department could restrict the sale of US technology (semiconductors, software, defence components) to specific Spanish companies through the so-called ‘Entity List‘. There have historically been occasional entries involving EU countries but for national security reasons, such as shell companies linked to Russia or Iran. The vast majority of listings currently concern China.
Spain, however, is in a privileged position under the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR). It appears in the A:5 country group (alongside Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea) with the most favourable treatment when it comes to export licences.
